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Entrepreneurship, Hardship, and Gamesmanship:
Modern Piracy as a Dry Endeavor
Selina MacLaren*
Abstract
Pirag has reemerged in the past decade, but internationallaws lag behind While modern -
daypiragy threatens lives and industries, antpiray efforts are constrained by internationallegal
definitions written centuries ago to address a crime that looked radicall diffirent from its
tweny-first-centugy counterpart. Today, piray networks are increasingly sophisticated and
land-based, butpiragy laws define the crime as one occurring on the high seas. Handcuffed by
the high seas requirement, nations prosecute onlyjuniorpirates while pirate kin ins operate
from the safey of land.
In recent months, lowerpiragy rates have promised stabilioy and masked the urgeng of
the threat. Although attacks have decreased, ransoms have skyrocketed and antzpiracy successes
come from methods resting on shaky legalfoundations. The false sense of complaceng in the
antzjpiragy movement onl heightens the need for a new definition ofpirag.
This Comment seeks a solution that will maintain existing international maritime laws
but interpret them in a way that extends the piragi definition to land-based activities. These
adjustments will efficiently deterpirates without the legalprecariousness of exisling anzpirag'
methods. It uses maritime treaties, counterterrorism tools, and familiar legal doctrines to pull
pirate kingins into the purview ofpiragi laws.
JD Candidate, 2014, The University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank
Professor Daniel Abebe and the CJIL staff for their guidance.
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"In an honest service there is thin commons, low wages, and hard labor; in this, pleny
and satiey, pleasure and ease, liberty and power; and who would not balance creditor on this
side, when all the hazard that is run for it, at worst, is ony a sour look or two at choking.
No, a mery life and a short one, shall be my motto. " -Bartholomew "Black Bart"
Roberts, pirate.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Mohammad Saaili Shibin was enjoying tea at an outdoor caf6 in his
hometown in Somalia when he was arrested. Authorities shuttled him into an
American plane headed for Virginia, where he faced trial in US federal court. He
Bartholomew "Black Bart" Roberts, in Daniel Defoe, A General Histoy of the Pyrates 244 (South
Carolina 1972) (M. Schonhorn, ed).
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had direct ties to pirate financiers and was accused of acting as a negotiator for
pirates who had tortured hostages for eight months before obtaining a $5
million ransom.2 Mr. Shibin's case epitomizes modem-day piracy: an evolving
form of organized crime grounded in finance, negotiation, and the complications
of extraterritoriality. These land-based activities are a far cry from the planks,
hooks, and eye patches of Black Bart's day, but the monetary motive remains.
There is no authoritative definition of piracy under customary international
law.' According to Blackstone, "piracy, by common law, consists in committing
those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed
upon land, would have amounted to felony there." 4 Blackstone similarly
described the pirate as hostis humanigeneris-an enemy of the human race-who
had committed "an offence against the universal law of society" and was
punishable under "the law of nations, as a part of the common law."' Despite a
long history of antipiracy efforts, international maritime laws have inconsistent
piracy definitions and, as a result, significant enforcement obstacles. These
weaknesses are exacerbated because modem piracy differs significantly from the
crime addressed by the law of nations definitions still undergirding treaties
today. Piracy has evolved, but the definitions have not.
Piracy was first codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas.6 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),:
the generally accepted statement of the international maritime law, defines piracy
as "illegal acts of violence or detention... committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship.., and directed: . . . on the high seas,
against another ship."8
Understanding the territorial limits of piracy is essential to safeguarding
ships because "some commentators estimate that up to 70 percent of recent
attacks have occurred in . . . territorial waters."' Restricting piracy pursuit to the
2 Carrie Johnson, For Pirates, US Courts Offer No Safe Harbor (National Public Radio July 18, 2012),
online at http://www.npr.org/2012/07/18/156913982/for-pirates-u-s-courts-offer-no-safe-
harbor (visited Apr 8, 2013).
3 Helmut Tuerk, The Resurgence of Piracy: A Phenomenon ofModern Times, 17 U Miami Intl & Comp L
Rev 1 (2009).
4 AnthonyJ. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 Va L Rev 1019, 1066 (2011).
5 Id at 1068.
6 Tuerk, The Resurgence of Piracy 1 (cited in note 3); United Nations Geneva High Seas Convention
(1958), Art 15(1), 13 UST 2312, (1962).
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Art 101, 1833 UN Treaty Ser No 3,
(1994) ("UNCLOS").
8 Id at Art 101.
9 Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy Within the Jurisdiction ofthe
International Criminal Court, 11 Chi J Intl L 197, 207 (2010).
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high seas allows pirates to retreat to countries like Somalia that are institutionally
incapable of capturing the pirates, and thus effectively exempts the perpetrators
of these attacks from prosecution. The high seas restriction is couched in
Westphalian sovereignty, the present system of international law that places
emphasis on sovereign and equal nation-states. 10 Notions of Westphalian
sovereignty are evident in UNCLOS and UN Security Council Resolutions,
which reaffirm territorial sovereignty."
Extraterritorial sovereignty may be necessary for the effective prosecution
of pirates. Antipiracy efforts face an ongoing problem in that seizing states are
reluctant to prosecute captured pirates, probably due to legal complexities and
human rights implications. Extraterritorial sovereignty, and specifically the
pursuit of pirates through more sophisticated means that include targeting profit
and pirate kingpins, would decrease piracy levels at a low cost without
implicating the constraints of sea-based pursuit.
In Section I, this Comment will explore the unique traits of modern-day
piracy and show that, despite falling piracy rates in recent years, the crime
remains an urgent international problem. Section II will consider existing
antipiracy efforts and show these efforts' vulnerabilities. Section I1n explains the
territorial sovereignty restrictions on antipiracy efforts, while Section IV
elaborates on various international attempts to overcome these restrictions
through treaties and resolutions. Finally, Section V suggests a new understanding
of piracy that encompasses land-based activities, allowing nations to more
aggressively and efficiently dismantle piracy organizations.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PIRACY
There were 278 pirate attacks and 27 hijackings worldwide in 2012.12
Today, Somali pirates hold nine vessels and 147 hostages. '3 There is reason,
10 Westphalian sovereignty is the term used to denote the type of sovereignty recognized with the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It rests on two principles of nonintervention: "territoriality and the
exclusions of external actors from domestic authority structures." Josef Joffe, Rethinking the
Nation-State: The Many Meanings of Sovereignty, 78 Foreign Aff 122, 124 (1999), quoting Stephen D.Krasner, Sovereigny: Organized Hypocris 264 (Prnceton 1999). In the piracy context, it
counterbalances extraterritorial sovereignty, which claims jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analog. Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow
Foundation, 45 Harv Intl L J 183,188 (2004); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 303
(Oxford 5th ed 1998).
11 UNCLOS Art 86 (cited in note 7).
12 Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, ICC Commercial Crime Services, online at
http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures (visited Apr 8, 2013); but see
No Somali pirate hiacking in nearly a year, says UN, The Guardian (Associated Press May 3, 2013),
online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/03/somali-pirate-hijacking (visited May
28, 2013) (reporting75 attacksoff Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and 14 hijackings). While the
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however, to believe that piracy is underreported.' 4 Somali waters and the Gulf of
Aden are clearly the areas most plagued by modem piracy. "5 This area is roughly
1.5 times the size of Western Europe, 6 and geography exacerbates the problem:
cargo ships transiting the Suez Canal are required to pass through the narrow
strait between the Hom of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
Piracy includes the crimes of violence, detention, and depredation, and can
happen on ships ranging from private yachts to oil supertankers. 7 Pirates usually
hijack a vessel with the goal to ransom both the vessel and its crew back to the
owners. Pirate kingpins operate from land, researching hostages' value online
and directing the complex piracy organizations without threat of direct capture
on the high seas. A single seizure can eam pirates $150,000-a significant figure
compared to Somalia's per capita GDP of $600.8 Considering the lack of
economic opportunity for many Somalis, the high-risk/high-reward nature of
piracy may be a rational choice in the absence of strong deterrence.
Pirates demonstrate a dangerous capacity for violence and an equally
dangerous understanding of international law.19 This understanding is
demonstrated by pirates' claims that they are motivated by a desire to protect
Somalia's resources. "Perpetrators of certain recent maritime crimes in the
region have claimed to be acting in defense of national environmental or
fisheries' interests, which might bring the scope of their actions out of the
private and into the public domain."'2 While the claims may be truthful, they
discrepancies may be attributable to different geographic samples, perhaps they also illustrate the
difficulty of defining, monitoring, and recording piracy attacks.
13 Id; Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Pirac off the Coast of Somalia, ASIL Insights
(American Society of International Law Feb 6, 2009), online at http://www.asil.org/insights090
206.cfm (visited Apr 12, 2013).
14 Tuerk, The Resurgence ofPiracj at 4 (cited in note 3), citing Piracy andArmed Robbery at Sea, Focus on
LMO (Intl Marit Org), Jan 2000, at 2, online at http://wwwimo.org/KnowledgeCentre/Referenc
esAndArchives/FocusOnlMO(Archives)/Documents/Focus%20on%201MO%20-%2OPiracy
%20and%20armed%20robbery%20at%20sea%20(January%202000).pdf (visited May 1, 2013).
15 Mike Madden, Tradingthe Shield ofSovereignoyfor the Scales ofJustice, 21 USF Marit LJ 139,154 (2009)
("Pirate attacks in Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden accounted for thirty-eight percent of all
global attacks in 2008 (approximately triple the number of attacks that took place in the next most
dangerous maritime areas off the coasts of Nigeria and Indonesia, respectively.)").
16 Alaric Nightingale and Isaac Arnsdorf, EU Force Bombs Somali Pirate Supplies in 1st Land Attack
(Bloomberg May 15, 2012), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 2 -05-15/eu-navy-
destroys-somali -pirates-supplies-in- shore-attack- 1-.html (visited Apr 8, 2013).
17 UNCLOS Art 101 (cited in note 7).
18 Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (cited in note 13).
19 Madden, 21 USF Marit L J at 152 (cited in note 15) ("[qontemporary Somali pirates are better
armed and better organized than others have been in the past. These pirates employ automatic
rifles and rocket propelled grenades ("RPG") in their attacks.").
20 Id at 153.
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also indicate that pirates are aware that the international legal definition of piracy
is restricted to private acts. These anti-fishing and anti-dumping claims evince a
nuanced understanding of these international legal loopholes.
Even though the number of successful hijackings has fallen dramatically
since the peak in 2009-11, ransoms have increased in price and pirates have
diversified, getting money by "switching sides" to help antipiracy companies or
engaging in other criminal activity like land-based kidnappings.21 Pirates are well
organized and have their own packets of paperwork-even on letterhead-to
deliver to their victims. 2 Some companies now offer "kidnap and ransom"
insurance policies to shipping companies, and in the event of a hijacking, these
insurance companies will negotiate with the pirates and pay the agreed ransom.'
Because piracy networks are becoming more sophisticated, any reported
decline in piracy levels should be read with caution. As this Comment will
demonstrate, purported successes in the fight against piracy may be short-lived,
and promising statistics may be misleading.
Furthermore, the high seas limitation on piracy prosecution insulates those
who are in charge of the criminal networks. Pirate kingpins, operating from the
safety of land, should be the main targets of antipiracy efforts for the same
intuitive reasons all criminal prosecution efforts attempt to capture the parties
highest in the chain of command. Low-level pirates are less likely to be deterred
because of greater financial need, and capturing low-level pirates does little to
dismantle the network. The capture of pirate kingpins, however, provides the
most deterrence at the smallest cost.
III. EXISTING ANTIPIRACY METHODS
A. Multinational Navy Patrols
An upsurge in piracy that began around 2008 led to international
cooperation through multinational navy patrols.24 One coalition-the European
21 Piray: Hung Drawn and Quartered (The Economist Nov 10, 2012), online at http://www.
economist.com/new s/international/21 565927-better-deterrents-are-putting-somali-pirates-
business-under-strain- hung-drawn- and (visited Apr 8, 2013) (explaining that piracy rates have
fallen dramatically); Somali Pirate K'ngins Enjoy 'Tmpuniy": UN Experts (Reuters Jul 18, 2012),
online at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2012/07/18/us-somalia-un-piracy-idUSBRE86GOZ
N20120718 (visited Apr 8, 2013) (explaining the diversification of piracy and higher ransoms).
22 Ben Berkowitz, Africa's Pirates Have Demands-And Letterhead, Too (Reuters Aug 13, 2012), online
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/1 3/us-insurance-pirates-idUSBRE87CO5Z20120813
(visited Apr 8, 2012).
23 Id.
24 Somalia Pirates: EU Approves Attacks on Land Bases (BBC News Mar 23, 2012), online at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17487767 (visited Apr 8, 2012).
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Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR)-is coordinated by the United States and
led by the US, UK, French, and Indian navies. It represents the first EU naval
force and the first military involvement of the EU in Somalia.' The coalition's
focus is limited to intervention and prevention-particularly the protection of
ships belonging to the US World Food Program-rather than pursuit and
apprehension.26 The maintenance cost of this coalition may not be justified in
light of the fact that it provides little deterrence of acts of piracy that promise
huge financial gains.27
After the 2008 attacks and the deployment of the international coalition,
the costs of piracy continued to increase. These costs came in the form of
security and rerouting costs, and higher average ransom payments.' Piracy in
2011 saw a lower success rate, but higher average ransoms, resulting in greater
21revenue for fewer hijackings.
B. Armed Security
A second and more recent form of antipiracy efforts is the use of weapons
and security personnel onboard private ships. These armed guards either work
for private security companies or are military personnel, and they make up a
large and growing industry.3" These efforts have been successful in lowering
piracy rates, but recent incidents make clear that armed security threatens to
increase violence and death on the high seas.31
Armed guards onboard ships occupy a hazy status under international law.
UNCLOS Article 107 authorizes only warships to seize pirates and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued warnings against the use of
weapons onboard private ships.32 Armed security also raises the risks of pirates
25 Judy Dempsey, With Pirates, EU 'fakes on Graver Risks, Intl Herald Trib 2 (Apr 3, 2012).
26 Id.
27 Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (cited in note 13).
28 In 2011, the shipping industry's security and rerouting costs were between $5.3 billion and $5.5
billion. The average ransom increased to around $5 million in 2011 from $4 million in 2010. The
number of hostages increased from 1090 in 2010 to 1118 in 2011. See Dempsey, With Pirates, EU
Takes on Graver Risks (cited in note 25) (citing a report by One Earth Future Foundation).
29 Id.
30 Nightingale and Arnsdorf, EU Force Bombs Somali Pirate Supplies (cited in note 16); Berkowitz,
Africa's Pirates Have Demands (cited in note 22).
31 See, for example, Muneeza Naqvi, India, Italy Wrangle Over Indian Fishermen Killing (The Huffington
Post Feb 22, 2012), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120222/as-india-
ship-firing/ (visited Apr 8, 2013) (describing the recent shooting deaths of two Indian fishermen,
allegedly mistaken for pirates by Italian marines serving as part of an on-board security team).
32 Ryan P. Kelley, UNCLOS, but No Cigar: Overcoming Obstacles to the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy, 95
Minn L Rev 2285, 2301-02 (2011).
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possessing and discharging weapons with claims of self-defense. Furthermore,
under international law, pirates are civilians, not combatants, and civilians may
only be targeted in immediate self-defense.33 For these reasons, private guards
cannot pursue, board, or seize suspected pirate ships in the absence of an overt
attack with a clear aggressor.
While the use of armed private security is widely considered an effective
solution in recent years, its similarities to international navy coalitions make clear
that private security may likewise prove to be an insufficient deterrent. Security
personnel onboard cargo ships operate in much the same way the international
coalition operates. While pirates' lower success rates seem to indicate the
efficacy of using security personnel, the increasing revenue gained by pirates
suggests that underlying problems still persist. Thus, despite the apparent
success of the armed security solution, a closer look at the numbers reveal the
solution's vulnerabilities.
C. Land-Based Pursuit
An on-land attack in May 2012-the first of its kind-may have sent an
important message to pirates, but it is too early to tell if such messages have any
real deterrent effect. The on-land attack was an air raid designed to destroy
pirates' equipment. It was based on Operation Atalanta, a EU mandate off the
Horn of Africa.' Operation Atalanta was expanded on March 23, 2012 by
EUNAVFOR to extend to December 2014. 35 This expansion also extended the
mandate to Somali coastal territory and internal waters. The purpose of this
extension was envisaged to target pirate infrastructure on beaches from air
rather than to allow on-land pursuit by marines.36 The Somali government
accepted this extension as a new form of collaboration and commended the May
air raid.3"
33 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV)
(1949), 75 UN Treaty Ser No 85 (1950); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol 1) (1977), 1125 UN Treaty Ser No 3 (1978).
34 Somalia Pirates: EU Approves Attacks on Land Bases (cited in note 24).
35 EU Expands Horn of Africa Anti-Pirac Alission (A] Jazeera English Mar 23, 2012), online at
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/2012323151946624879.html (visited Apr 8,
2013).
36 Somalia Pirates: EU Approves Attacks on Land Bases (cited in note 24).
37 Id; Jeffrey Gettleman, Toughening Its Stand, European Union Sends Forces to Strike Somali Pirate Base,
NY Times A4 (May 16, 2012).
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Nations disagree about the desirability of land-based antipiracy pursuit.38
As a result, the extension is restricted. Helicopters may attack pirate
infrastructure such as boats and gasoline reserves along the shoreline with
machine guns, but marines may not set foot on ground, helicopters may not
target people, and rockets are not to be used. 3" These restrictions are significant
in addressing several nations' concerns that the extension of Operation Atalanta
would put civilians at risk-a particularly valid concern for two reasons. First,
pirates are deeply embedded in the local population, contributing both ransom
money and local vices to poverty-stricken communities. ° Second, the collective
experience in Afghanistan has evidenced the great risk posed to civilians in
NATO bombings.41
The May airstrike destroyed three or five skiffs (depending on the source)
and other material including "four ladders, a half tanker of fuel, two fishing nets
and mobiles," according to a self-professed pirate at the incident.42 The nearest
village was eleven miles away and no pirates or civilians were wounded, but an
elder from the village stated that the attack frightened civilians, and urged
Westerners to target pirates carefully.43 Locals reported that what they believed
to be European spy planes scoped out the area in the preceding days, prompting
fishermen to forgo fishing.' Lt. Comdr. Jacqueline Sheriff, a spokesperson for
the EU's antipiracy force, called the airstrike "a fantastic opportunity" and
declared the EU's mission to "make life more difficult for these guys."4
The expansion of Operation Atalanta to Somali beaches is an unfruitful
method of combating piracy. As shown by the May airstrike, such land attacks
38 Dempsey, With Pirates, EU Takes on Graver Risks (cited in note 25):
France, Britain and the Netherlands have long been in favor of pursuing
pirates on land so as to deny them their easy retreat. But Germany, Spain and
Australia are not willing to agree to a robust extension of the mandate, being
afraid casualties both among their own soldiers and among Somalia's civilian
population.
39 Id.
40 See, for example, Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Needed, 33
Fordham Intl LJ 372, 384 (2010); Yvonne M. Dutton, Maritime Piracy and the Impuniy Gap:
Insufficient NationalLaws or Lack of Political Will?, 86 Tul L Rev 1111, 1130 (2012) ("Somalia boasts
a 'stock exchange' where locals can contribute money or weapons to pirate gangs in exchange for
a share of any ransoms.').
41 Id.
42 First Official EU Strike on Land (Somalia Report May 15, 2012), online at
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3353/First-OfficialEUStrike on Land
(visited Apr 9, 2013).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Gettleman, Toughening Its Stand (cited in note 37).
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disrupt the livelihood of locals, despite the restrictions on the mandate that
preclude direct civilian attack.' The attacks are also not financially harmful to
pirates. The skiffs most likely to be stored on land are small twenty-foot
fiberglass or plastic skiffs filled with foam; the more valuable twin-engine skiffs
are stored at sea. 47 As discussed earlier, piracy continues to be profitable despite
lower attack rates because ransom prices have increased.48 Targeting piracy
infrastructure is thus misguided, providing little deterrence to pirates and instead
threatening local civilians. Instead, land-based antipiracy measures should be
carefully cabined to target activities that are most likely to be conducted by pirate
kingpins, such as cyber research on hostages' worth.
IV. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND JUS COGENS
A. Piracy as a Peremptory Norm
Antipiracy efforts are constrained by rules of territorial sovereignty. A
preliminary question that may overcome this constraint is whether combatting
piracy-declared hostis humani generis-is an international peremptory norm,
also known as jus cogens, which literally translates to "compelling law." These
norms are universally binding and inalienable. The principle ofjus cogens forbids
states to enter treaties that violate certain peremptory norms.49 A peremptory
norm is "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character."5 International peremptory norms trump territorial
sovereignty and void inconsistent treaties."'
Peremptory norms find their roots in a 1758 discussion grounded in
natural law.52 The first enforcement in world history of international norms
46 Id.
47 First Official EU Strike on Land (cited in note 42).
48 Lucas Bento, Toward an InternationalLawof Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy
Law Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29 Berkeley J Intl L 399, 407 (2011).
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art 53, 1155 UN Treaty Ser No 331 (1980).
50 Id.
51 Id. (Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a treaty that conflicts
with a peremptory norm is void).
52 See Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and
to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns 108-09 (G.G. & J. Robinson 1758) (discussing universal
jurisdiction over "perfect" rights); see also Christopher A. Ford, Essay, AdjudicatingJus Cogens, 13
Wis Intl L J 145, 149 (1994) ("Scholars and jurists have disagreed sharply over the origin ofjus
cogens norms, seeing them as deriving, variously, from international custom, from express treaties,
from natural law, or from some combination of such factors.'); Case Concerning East Timor (Port v
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upon individuals occurred in the Nuremberg Trials. Since then, peremptory
norms defining criminal offenses have increased in number. 3 Ulrich Scheuner
has identified three groups of peremptory norms:
The first that comes into consideration encompasses the maxims of
international law which protect the foundations of law, peace and humanity
in the international order and which at present are considered by nations as
the minimum standard for their mutual relations.... A second group of
rules and principles is comprised in the rules of peaceful cooperation in the
sphere of international law which protects fundamental common interests.
... A third sphere of imperative norms regards the protection of humanity,
especially of the most essential human rights. ... [T]hose rules which
protect human dignity, personal and racial equality, life and personal
freedom can certainly be acknowledged as inalienable law.4
Combatting piracy probably falls under the second category because pirate-
free waters are certainly a fundamental common interest. All trading nations are
invested in the prospect of transporting cargo without threat of violence.
Perhaps the "peaceful cooperation" language in Scheuner's analysis indicates not
only that combatting piracy is a peremptory norm, but cooperation with
antipiracy efforts is itself a norm. Such a reading may require Somalia to consent
to any land-based pursuit of pirates. This is not controversial because thus far
the Somali government has cooperated, eager for help in dealing with a problem
it cannot alone solve. However, such a reading, when taken to its logical
conclusion, may mean that no state can claim territorial sovereignty to block
pursuit of pirates within its borders. This exercise in thought shows the
inevitable tension between territorial sovereignty and peremptory norms, and the
enduring struggle to find a balance between an under-inclusive and over-
inclusive definition of piracy.
B. Somali Territorial Sovereignty
In the eighteenth century, it was generally accepted that a state could claim
sovereignty over a territorial sea if the state was capable of exercising sovereignty
there and protecting the waters."5 UNCLOS, however, lays out a more
Australia), 1995 ICJ 90 (June 30, 1995) (recognizing the right of self-determination as one of the
essential principles of contemporary international law).
53 See, for example, International Militagy Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgments and Sentences, 41 Am J Intl L
172, 205 (1947).
54 Jack Alan Levy, AsfBetveenPrincz and King: Reassessing the LawForeignSovereignImniv as Applied
toJus Cogens Violators, 86 Geo LJ 2703, 2706 (1998), quoting Ulrich Scheuner, Conflict of Treaty
Pronisions with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law, 27 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandisches
Offentliches Recht Und Volkerrecht 520, 526-27 (1967).
55 Debra Doby, PiracjJure Gentium: TheJurisdictionalConflict of the High Seas and Territorial Waters, 41 J
Mar L & Corn 561, 572 (2010), citing Madden, 21 USF Marit LJ at 141 (cited in note 15).
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quantifiable rule that applies uniformly to all states. Under UNCLOS, every state
has the right to claim twelve nautical miles off the coastline. 6 This rule applies
even if the state is unable to protect and regulate those waters. It is this twelve-
mile area off the coast of Somalia that serves as a legal safe harbor for pirates.
With the goal of preventing pirates from availing themselves of the
protection of Somali territorial sovereignty, scholars have suggested changes to
the UNCLOS provision or its interpretation. These changes are sometimes
justified with reference to innocent passage, the concept (laid out in UNCLOS
Section 3) that allows a vessel to pass through another state's territorial waters,
subject only to the limitation that the passage does not threaten the "peace, good
order or security of the coastal State." At least one scholar has determined that
the right of innocent passage already curtails a State's sovereignty and thus sets
the foundation for an expansion of universal jurisdiction in counter-piracy
efforts."7 There are obvious limitations to proposed changes to the relevant
UNCLOS provision. For example, the "high seas" requirement cannot be
eliminated altogether: "high seas" is synonymous with international waters, and
an elimination of this restriction would result in an international treaty that
opens territorial waters for entry by any and all nations. 8 It is widely accepted
that such a change to UNCLOS would lead to inter-state conflict.
59
Other scholars have suggested the addition of a protocol to Article 100 of
UNCLOS, providing international parties the ability to pursue pirates in
territorial waters under certain closely defined circumstances. The most common
circumstance permitting such pursuit would be the inability of a state to police
its own waters. The United Nations Security Council and IMO would determine
whether a state has the ability to protect its own waters.6 A related academic
56 UNCLOS, Art 3 (cited in note 7) ("Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles, measured from baselines
determined in accordance with this Convention.").
57 Doby, 41 J Mar L & Coin at 574 (cited in note 55), citing Madden, 21 USF Marit LJ at 157-58
(cited in note 15); see also UNCLOS Arts 17-26 (cited in note 7).
58 Doby, 41 J Mar L & Corm at 574 (cited in note 55).
59 Id ("By removing the "high seas" requirement, foreign naval vessels receive a blanket right to
enter any State's territorial seas to combat piracy which will create multiple opportunities for
abuse.").
60 Doby, 41 J Mar L & Com at 574 (cited in note 55).
[Aittaching a protocol to article 100 of UNCLOS may provide international
forces with a limited right to respond in specific situations where States cannot
protect their own territorial seas from piracy. A protocol could recognize and
emphasize the State's sovereignty while also providing a prompt response to
rising levels of piracy. The United Nations Security Council might designate,
after consultation with IMO, those States deemed incapable of policing their
own territorial seas. Such designation might be reviewed at specified intervals
and renewed, as necessary.
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suggestion is the ability for a state to make its own determination that it is not
adequately equipped to police its own waters, and thereby voluntarily forfeit its
territorial sovereignty if and when it is unable to meet its international
"obligations."61
A final approach is a change in interpretation rather than substance. At
least one scholar has suggested that Somalia cannot have a territorial sea because
it is a failed state.62 Under this proposed solution, any failed state would leave its
waters open for foreign naval intervention. This change leaves open the problem
of defining a failed state, and may not apply in the context of Somalia, which has
a weak government but is still recognized as a sovereign entity by the
international community.63 In order for this final proposal to succeed, one of
two things would be necessary. First, the international community may have to
tighten its recognition of sovereignty, declaring Somalia and related weak states
as failed states. This would deprive weak states of a host of international legal
rights both within and without UNCLOS and would also result in huge political
complications. Alternatively, UNCLOS can be read as applying only to strong
states, and weak states are denied sovereignty for the limited exercise of
recognizing territorial waters. Both of these options presuppose the solution-a
reduced sovereignty for Somalia. A viable solution must show how Somalia's
sovereignty can be made compatible with international rule of law. Any solution
that scales back Somalia's sovereignty presupposes the resolution of a much
greater obstacle than counter-piracy: the derogation of territorial sovereignty.
Thus, it is clear that territorial sovereignty principles are a major constraint
to prosecution of any land-based or territorial sea-based pirate activities. Many
international criminal lawyers consider rule of law and territorial sovereignty to
be directly at odds with one another. But it is important to note that if
sovereignty were strengthened in Somalia, allowing the nation to prosecute
pirates within its territorial sea, the international crime of piracy could be
solved.' 4 Although sovereignty does not unnecessarily constrain the rule of law,
61 Id at 575, citing Dr. Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 Ann Surv Intl
& Comp L 43, 54 (2009) (Instead of altering the UNCLOS definition, Dr. Kenyuan supoests that
any State should "forfeit its UNCLOS rights if] unable to discharge its international
responsibility.").
62 Doby, 41 J Mar L & Corn at 576 (cited in note 55) ('"Ms. Bahar, alternatively, argues Somalia
cannot have a territorial sea because it is not a State.'). Compare James Fergusson, A Failed State
Is Back From the Dead, The Independent on Sunday 35 (Jan 13, 2013) (discussing cautious
optimism that Somalia, a country long dubbed the "world's most failed state," might be entering a
period of peace and stable government).
63 Doby, 41 J Mar L & Com at 576 (cited in note 55).
64 Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round? 16 EurJ Intl L 979, 985
(2005) online at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/16/5/333.pdf (visited Apr 9, 2013) ("However the
prevention of international crimes cannot occur without sovereignty.").
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international criminal law may be seen to impede sovereignty under certain
circumstances because it generally adopts a broad view of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.6
The solutions suggested for overcoming territorial sovereignty to prosecute
international criminals that violate peremptory norms may also apply in other
situations, like in Sierra Leone, where rebel forces were fighting a weak
government that could not control the factions. Ultimately, arguments can be
made that reduced sovereignty is most effective for criminal prosecution, and
counterarguments can be advanced that increased sovereignty (through
strengthening the nation) would achieve the same end. It is not entirely clear
whether Somalia's sovereignty is a desirable goal or an impediment to antipiracy
efforts.
C. Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction holds that a nation can prosecute offenses to which it
has no connection at all. Piracy was the world's first universal jurisdiction
crime.66 Universal jurisdiction is necessary in antipiracy efforts because
documents like the Rome Convention and UNCLOS apply only to parties of the
treaties-that is, signatory parties.6" Pirates by definition operate privately, and
thus are not parties to the treaties. Universal jurisdiction creates a venue for
prosecution of any person who meets the definition of a pirate.68 Thus, under
the theory of universal jurisdiction, a person who meets the international
definition of a pirate can be captured and prosecuted in a nation, under that
nation's laws, without any tie to the nation.
Universal jurisdiction is also anticipated by existing international maritime
law documents. For example, the Rome Convention arguably implies universal
jurisdiction in calling for prosecution by signatory states "without delay" and
treating piracy as an offense of a "grave nature."69 UNCLOS Article 105
expressly gives member states authority to prosecute captured pirates.7"
65 Id ("International criminal law has traditionally adopted a broad view of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.").
66 Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (cited in note 13). See also
Matthew C. Houghton, Walking the Plank How United Nations Securi , Council Resolution 1816, While
Progressive, Fails to Provide A Comprehensive Solution to Somali Piray, 16 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L 253,
269-70 (2009); Kontorovich, 45 Harv Intl LJ at 184-85 (cited in note 10).
67 Houghton, 16 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L at 269-70 (cited in note 66).
68 Id.
69 Id at 270-71.
70 Id at 271.
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Nonetheless, universal jurisdiction is not the magic bullet in antipiracy
enforcement because it does not, in and of itself, permit land-based pursuit. This
is evident from the recent case of US vAli,7 the US's first universal jurisdiction
prosecution of a Somali pirate.72 In this case, the US became one of only three
countries in the world to use universal jurisdiction against a Somali pirate. " The
US government lied to a suspected pirate to get him to come onto US soil,
making capture possible.74 This illustrates that actual means of capture are
necessary before universal jurisdiction may be exercised. Universal jurisdiction
merely establishes who may prosecute; it does not seek to redefine piracy.
V. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW
While it is clear that existing antipiracy solutions are not viable in the long-
term, the search for an alternative begins with an understanding of international
maritime law as established in treaties and resolutions. International law relies on
domestic antipiracy statutes for enforcement. "Thus piracy, as a legal offense,
exists in two forms: piracy jure gentium (under the law of nations) and piracy as
defined by municipal law."" This Section focuses on the broader piracy jure
genltum, as seen in treaties and resolutions. The relevant treaties encompass the
many definitions of piracy that were understood as controlling under customary
international law before ratification.76
A. UNCLOS and the Rome Convention Compared
The two primary international laws guiding antipiracy efforts are UNCLOS
and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, more commonly known as the Rome
Convention.' UNCLOS, the established statement of international maritime
law, has been called a "constitution of the oceans" and codifies the generally
71 870 F Supp 2d 10 (DDC 2012).
72 Eugene Kontorovich, From Prof Eugene Kontorovich, About Today's Piracy Decision (The Volokh
Conspiracy July 13, 2012), online at http://www.volokh.com/2012/07 /13 /from-prof-eugene-
kontorovich-about-todays-piracy-decision/ (visited Apr 10, 2013).
73 Id.
74 Al, 870 F Supp 2d at 17.
75 Tara Hel fman, Marauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the Problem of Maritime Piracy
(Partly) Wrong, 62 Syracuse L Rev 53, 57-58 (2012).
76 Barry Hart Dubner, On the Definition of the Crime of Sea Piracy Revisited: Customaq vs. 71 reaqy Law and
the Jurisdictional Implications Thereof, 42 J Mar L & Corn 71, 91 (2011).
77 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (1988), 1678 UN Treaty Set No 222 (1992) (The Rome Convention).
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accepted definition of piracy.7" The Rome Convention was adopted during the
UNCLOS ratification process and was a product of UN action through the
International Maritime Organization.79 Both UNCLOS and the Convention
share the goals of increasing maritime safety and reducing violence on the high
seas, but the two bear important differences, particularly regarding the territorial
limits on piracy law enforcement.
Broadly speaking, UNCLOS indicates that international law restricts the
definition of piracy to acts occurring on water. Articles 105 and 110 of
UNCLOS address pirate seizure and ship-to-ship encounters on the high seas.
The official commentary on Article 101 of UNCLOS states: "Piracy can be
committed only on the high seas or in a place situation outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any State."8 Further, UNCLOS includes in its piracy definition
the requirement that "any illegal acts of violence or detention" be directed "on
the high seas" or "in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State."" An
explanatory note for a similar provision that provided the foundation for
UNCLOS emphasizes that the act must take place outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of any one state.8 2
The 1958 Geneva Convention on High Seas (Geneva LOS) 3 was the
predecessor to UNCLOS, and thus the two have nearly identical provisions on
piracy. The United States, which has not ratified UNCLOS, is a party to Geneva
LOS, but nearly all other major players in the fight against maritime piracy are
parties to UNCLOS. 8' The International Law Commission, in drafting the piracy
provisions of the Geneva LOS, relied heavily on Harvard's 1932 Draft
Convention on Piracy. It states, in part: "all individuals-perpetrators and
facilitators alike-must be physically present on the high seas during the
commission of the actus reus to be guilty of the piracy jure gentium." This
78 Made Andi Arsana, Tbree Decades of the Constitution of the Oceans, The Jakarta Post 7 (Jan 7,2013),
online at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/01/07/three-decades-constitution-oceans.
html (visited Apr 11, 2013).
79 Houghton, 16 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L at 273 (cited in note 66).
80 Myron H. Nordquist, et al, 3 UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982:A Commentay 197
(Martinus Nijhoff 2002).
81 UNCLOS Art 101 (cited in note 7).
82 Jon Bellish, Breaking News from 1932: Pirate Facilitators Must Be Physically Present on the High Seas
(EJIL: Talk! Sep 19, 2012), online at http://www.ejiltalk.org/breaking-news-from-1932-pirate-
facilitators-must-be-physically-present-on-the-high-seas/ (visited Apr 11,2013); UNCLOS at Art
3 (cited in note 7) ('The act of instigation or facilitation is not subjected to the common
jurisdiction unless it takes place outside territorial jurisdiction.").
83 Kelley, 95 Minn L Rev at 2297 (cited in note 32).
84 Id at 2296.
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language and history behind UNCLOS supports a definition of piracy that
precludes criminal liability for pirate kingpins operating from land.
Further, UNCLOS's provision for "hot pursuit" of suspected pirates
appears at first to overcome the possibility of safe retreat for pirates but in fact is
subject to many limitations.85 The provision specifies only governmental ships
may engage in hot pursuit, and only in situations where the pursuing state
believes the suspected pirate has broken that state's law. 86 The pursuing ship
must give the piratical vessel a clear signal to stop before engaging in pursuit,
and the hot pursuit is only permitted outside of the pursuing ship's territorial
waters if the pursuit is uninterrupted and outside of other states' territorial
waters.87 These limitations effectively nullify the "hot pursuit" benefits by
preventing pursuit in the territorial waters of nations that are unable to capture
the suspected pirates.
But UNCLOS does not quite settle whether piracy can occur on land.
Other sources can be read to indicate that piracy affirmatively may occur on
land. One such source-and probably the most legally binding source
supporting the possibility of land-based piracy-is the Rome Convention, which
"mandate[s] that its state parties establish jurisdiction over acts that would
otherwise constitute piracy under UNCLOS."88 Unlike UNCLOS, the Rome
Convention has no express territorial limitation. The benefits of the Rome
Convention come from its coverage of two gaps left by UNCLOS. First, states
under the Convention are required to establish jurisdiction over acts of maritime
violence within their territorial waters. Second, state parties are required to
establish jurisdiction over nationals who have committed maritime violence on
the high seas. These jurisdictional requirements force signatories to act well
beyond what is required under UNCLOS. Importantly, the Rome Convention,
unlike UNCLOS, does not limit piracy to the high seas, but rather discusses
piracy within the territorial waters of Member States.
Notwithstanding this broad treatment of piracy, the Rome Convention
contains significant limitations on the pursuit of pirates. Article 7 of the
Convention gives states discretion in arresting pirate suspects, and the
Convention, like UNCLOS, prevents pursuit of pirates into the sovereign waters
85 UNCLOS Art 111 (cited in note 7).
86 Houghton, 16 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L at 273 (cited in note 66).
87 Id at 273.
88 Thomas Fedeli, The Rights and Liabilities of Private Actors: Pirates, Master, and Crew *5 (One Earth
Foundation Working Paper, July 2010), online at http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/
Rights%20and%20Liabilities%20 -%20Fedeli. pdf (visited Apr 11, 2013).
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of another nation.89 Further, the Rome Convention signatories are prohibited
from seizing ships without a specific connection to the vessel.9" In this sense, the
Convention is narrower in scope than UNCLOS, which permits a Member State
to board a suspected pirate ship without a specific connection, so long as the
ship is on the high seas or in the state's territorial waters.9 These limitations
appear to cripple the otherwise far-reaching antipiracy provisions of the
Convention, and despite its apparent benefits, it has only been invoked to
establish jurisdiction in one reported case.92
It becomes clear, then, that both UNCLOS and the Rome Convention
contain provisions accommodating the pursuit of piracy on land. While the latter
is broader and more amenable to land-based piracy prosecution, both UNCLOS
and the Convention vacillate on the international status of land-based piracy.
B. UN Security Council Resolutions Responding to Piracy
Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council may
authorize the use of military force against threats to international security. A
number of UN Security Council Resolutions passed under this chapter have
expressly permitted foreign navies to patrol and capture pirates within the
territorial waters of Somalia, and even on land.
The first such resolution was passed in June 2008. It authorized any foreign
navy to enter Somali territorial waters and use all necessary force to combat
piracy that would be consistent with the treatment of piracy by international law,
if that piracy had instead been committed on the high seas.93 This resolution
stressed that it was limited to Somalia and did not alter customary international
rule.94 A second resolution, passed in October 2008, used similar language.95 A
third resolution, passed in December 2008, authorized any and all countries
combating piracy off the Somali coast to engage pirates on land or sea provided
there is advance consent by the then-ruling Transitional Federal Government
89 Houghton, 16 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L at 275 (cited in note 66), citing Ethan C. Stiles, Reforming
Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy, 27 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev 299, 312 (2004).
90 Houghton, 16 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L at 275 (cited in note 66).
91 Id.
92 Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (cited in note 13), citing
United States v Shi, 525 F3d 709, 721 (9th Cir 2008).
93 Security Council Res No 1816, UN Doc S/RES/1816 (2008).
94 Kristen Boon, Security Council Debates Maritime Piracy (Opinio Juris Nov 21, 2012), online at
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/11/21/security-council-debates-maritime-piracy/ (visited Apr 12,
2013).
95 Security Council Res No 1838, UN Doc S/RES/1838 (2008).
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(TFG).96 The consent requirement did not pose a significant obstacle to action
because the TFG was eager for international assistance." 7
In addition to these resolutions dealing with territorial issues, other
resolutions address the related issue of piracy facilitation.98 Note, however, that
these UN Security Council Resolutions reaffirm the customary international
legal norm of territorial sovereignty, even while calling for sweeping measures to
combat piracy facilitation. 9
Related to these resolutions, a Security Council presidential statement was
released in 2012 to highlight future trends in the Council's approach to piracy.
This statement emphasizes the issue's global dimensions and calls for the
development of new rules of deployment for private security contracts. Not all
members were comfortable with the statement. Argentina, for example, opposed
the Council's assertion of jurisdiction on the ground that, in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances (including Somalia's state of piracy), piracy falls
under UNCLOS and is not within the Council's domain."0 Responding to these
concerns, the Security Council imposed limitations on the resolutions, first
affirming that the resolutions applied solely to Somalia's piracy situation and did
not alter customary international law, and secondly requiring that any action
within Somali territory comport with international law and be approved by the
Somali government.'°
96 Security Council Res No 1851, UNDoc S/RES/1851 (2008) (permittingnationsto"undertake all
necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea"). Somalia is in the process of building a federal parliamentary republic
and a new Somali administration took office in 2012. The new President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud granted amnesty to hundreds of pirates, not including those convicted by courts or
wanted by Interpol. Yara Boyoumy, Somalia to Get SmallArmsAfter UN Lifts Embargo (Reuters Mar
28, 2013), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/us-somalia-arms-idUSBRE
92ROCQ20130328 (visited Apr 12, 2013).
97 Michael Davey, A Pirate Looks at the Tweny-First Century: The Legal Status of Somali Pirates in an Age of
Sovereign Seas and Human Ri ghts, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 1197, 1211 (2010).
98 Security Council Res No 1950, UN Doc S/RES/1 950 *5 (2011) (calling on member states "to
assist Somalia ... to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or
undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea"); Security Council Res No 2020, UN
Doc S/RES/2020 *5 (2011) ("[r]ecogniz[ing] the need to investigate and prosecute ... anyone
who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks
involved in piracy who illicitly plan, organize, facilitate, or finance and profit from such attacks").
99 Kontorovich, InternationalLegalResponses to Piracy offthe Coast of Somalia (cited in note 13) ("The text
accompanying the resolutions and statements made by Council members stressed that the
resolutions applied solely to the Somali situation, and would not establish any precedent of
customary international law.').
100 Boon, Security Council Debates Maritime Piracy (cited in note 94).
101 Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (cited in note 13) (noting
that the transitional Somali government welcomed these resolutions because it was too weak to
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It is paramount to note that in practice, "the authority given by these
resolutions has gone largely if not entirely unutilized."' 12 The impracticability of
the resolutions arises because they are inadequate in providing sufficient legal
guideposts to foreign navies. By creating an exception to the rule for Somalia,
rather than blessing the UN's antipiracy efforts on a broader level, the
resolutions may be read to reinforce the sovereignty restrictions of customary
international law. As a result, foreign navies hesitate to enforce the resolutions. °3
C. Regional Piracy Laws
Regional agreements are a third solution to antipiracy efforts, and are
perhaps the most logical in light of the regionally constrained nature of piracy.
For example, the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCC) is an instrument of
cooperation between nine states located near the Gulf of Aden, including the
Somalia TFG. The DCC requires states to arrest pirates if they have the capacity
to do so, but many signatories including Somalia lack such capacity.
Furthermore, the DCC does not allow pursuit of pirates into territorial waters
without express consent.1" This example suggests that existing regional
agreements may do little to strengthen enforcement above and beyond what is
already provided by existing UN resolutions and treaties because regional
agreements are constrained by the signatories' capacities. In other words, nations
with greater capacities for piracy prosecution and equally strong stakes in
maritime safety frequently are not located in the threatened region. Despite the
regional nature of piracy, a large number of nations have a stake in the outcome
of antipiracy efforts due to the area's value as a commercial shipping route. As
such, the antipiracy effort should involve international rather than regional
cooperation and enforcement.
deal with the piracy problem itself, but other states with a history of piracy problems worried that
the unprecedented resolutions would lead to an erosion of national territorial sovereignty).
102 Id.
103 Davey, A Pirate Looks at the Twenty First Centug at 1212 (cited in note 97):
While the Resolutions have been helpful in combating piracy in some respects,
they have not provided adequate legal guideposts to foreign navies. The
Resolutions presume to authorize an enormous exception in the case of
Somalia to customary international law, rather than blessing the anti-piracy
activities that the UN is encouraging as customary international law, with the
result that some foreign navies are reluctant to engage in activities that
constitute the exception to the rule.
104 Fedeli, The Rights and Liabilities of Private Actors *6 (cited in note 88), citing The Code of Conduct
Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Western Indian Oceans and the
Gulf of Aden Art 1, Jan 29, 2009, online at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/
Pages/DCoC.aspx (visited Apr 12, 2013).
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VI. A NEW APPROACH
While the ideal solution is a top-down approach that strengthens the
Somali government and fosters economic opportunity for those Somalis who
currently rely on criminal activity for their livelihood, this solution is a long-term
policy goal, and not an immediate legal response to the changing dynamics of
piracy. The following frameworks draw analogies between modern-day piracy
networks and existing international crimes and doctrines in order to show that
international maritime law should be read to include land-based activity in the
definition of piracy. This approach would permit strong governments with a
stake in safe maritime passage to dismantle piracy networks without resorting to
violence or high-cost patrol measures. It satisfies criminal law goals by allowing
for retribution against the most culpable criminals, and it would have the same
deterrent effect as armed guards without costing private companies profit or
innocent fishermen their lives. These solutions work where navy patrols, armed
security, and infrastructure destruction fail because they overcome constraints of
territorial sovereignty while maintaining the structure of existing international
maritime law.
A. Aiding and Abetting
First and foremost, the international community should expand the jus
cogens piracy definition to include providing material support to pirates.
Historically, aiding and abetting liability for piracy has been consistently
confirmed across various jurisdictions. o' There are three general categories of
facilitating under aiding and abetting jurisprudence: (1) counsel and
procurement; (2) material assistance; and (3) profit."° Each of these three types
of aid is provided within today's increasingly sophisticated piracy networks. The
most important type of aid consists of hostage information generated through
online research by land-based pirate kingpins. Other important types of aid are
hostage negotiations, accounting, and even hospitality for hostages.7 These
nodes of aid are crucial because complex support industries have developed to
facilitate piracy from the evident safety of land, and these facilitators are
traceable through low-resource, non-violent methods. The facilitators-many of
them professionals with legitimate income opportunities elsewhere-are also
105 Martha Lovejoy, From Aiding Pirates to Aiding Human Rights Abusers: 71 ranslating the Eighteenth-Centugy
Paradigm of the Law of Nations for the Alien Tort Statute, 12 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 241, 254-55
(2009).
106 Id at 256.
107 Houghton, 16 TulsaJ Comp & Intl L at 262 (cited in note 66).
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more likely to respond to deterrence efforts than are pirates engaging in actual
attacks on the high seas.
1. Aiding and abetting liability and its elements in existing
international treaties.
Both UNCLOS Article 110 and Geneva LOS Article 15 create three
separate offenses, all called piracy. One of these three offenses includes "any act
of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act [of piracy]."' 8 The high seas
requirement is excluded from the third piracy offense of facilitation in both,
indicating that under UNCLOS and Geneva LOS, facilitation of piracy can
happen on land."° This facilitation would constitute one type of piracy and thus
would be prosecutable independently of the capture of a high seas pirate.
The Rome Convention likewise addresses facilitation. Attempting or
abetting the commission of any of the acts described as piracy is an offense. 110
The Rome Convention goes further to declare that threats to commit certain
offenses-specifically, an act of violence, damage to a ship, or destruction to
navigational facilities---constitute an offense in itself.111 Some have argued that
the Convention's threat provision does not apply to piracy because the
Convention is addressing terrorist threats that happen on the high seas, as
distinct from piracy. While the motivating factor for enactment of the
Convention was indeed a terrorist attack and the history of the treaty confirms
an impetus of counterterrorism, nothing in the Rome Convention expressly
restricts any of the provisions to terrorism." 2 The Convention does not require
the attack to be for either private or public ends. The language of the fourth
preambular paragraph makes clear that navigational safety was a primary
concern of the parties, implying that prosecution of a particular "type" of
criminal was less important than the level of the threat." 3 This navigation-centric
approach fully supports the pursuit of land-based activities that may create a
threat as great as, or even greater than, that posed by pirates patrolling the high
seas.
108 UNCLOS, Art 101(c) (cited in note 7).
109 Douglas Guilfoyle, Committing iracy on Dgy Land: LiabiliyforFacilitaing Piracy (EJIL: Talk! July 26,
2012), online at http://www.eiltalk.org/committing-piracy-on-dry-land-liability-for- facilitating-
piracy/ (visited Apr 12, 2012).
110 The Rome Convention at Art 3 (cited in note 77).
111 Id.
112 The Rome Convention was a response to a 1985 maritime terrorist attack in which Palestinian
terrorists took control of an Italian cruise ship in Egyptian waters. Tullio Treves, The Conventionfor
the Suppression of UnlawfnulActsAgainst the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2 Singapore J Intl & Comp L
541, 543 (1998).
113 See The Rome Convention, Preamble (cited in note 77).
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Domestic piracy laws, often modeled on international treaties, would have
to restructure and expand to accommodate the newjus cogens piracy definition.
Currently, for example, the US law on piracy facilitation does not apply to
material supporters of piracy."' Contrary to this legislative gap, the US
government has issued policy guidance declaing a goal to disrupt pirates'
financial backing and target the suppliers of their fuel, outboard motors, ladders,
and other supplies."'
The elements of international aiding and abetting liability is discussed in
Doe I v Unocal Corp"' and illustrated by Prosecutor v FurundZ)a,"7 wherein the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that "the actus reus of
aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime."'1 i The Commission noted that the act need not be a
necessary element for the perpetration of the crime, so long as it "make[s] a
significant difference to the commission of the criminal act.""' Further, the
mens rea of aiding and abetting liability under international law appears to be
"reasonable knowledge" that the action will assist the perpetrator of the crime. 120
A positive intent to commit the crime is not necessary.
2. Challenges in applying aiding and abetting to piracy.
The issue of aiding and abettingin the piracy context faces the challenge of
timing limitations and the risk of over-inclusivity. For example, in the recent
case of US v Ali,12' the US federal court found that the Geneva LOS includes
114 Daniel Pines, Maritime Piray: Changes in US Law Needed to Combat This Critical National Secunry
Concern, 36 Seattle U L Rev 69, 120 n 435 (2012) ("While US statutes already prohibit providing
ammunition or provisions to pirates, 18 USC § 1657, and knowingly receiving pirated property, 18
USC § 1660,... these provisions are shotgun approaches to the problem and do not cover as
many acts as a material-support- to-piracy statute would.").
115 Id at 120, citing Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, US Dept of State, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, Remarks to International Institute for Strategic Studies (Mar 30, 2011), online at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/1 59419.htm (visited Apr 12, 2013).
116 395 F3d 932, 950 (9th Cir 2002).
"17 38 ELM 317 (1999).
118 Id at 365.
19 Unocal Corp, 395 F3d at 950, quoting Furund! ia, 38 ILM at 364; see also Unocal Corp, 395 F3d at
950, quoting Prosecutorv Musema, ICTR-96-1 3-T (Jan 27, 2000) (stating that the actus reus of aiding
and abetting is "all acts of assistance in the form of either physical or moral support" that
"substantially contribute to the commission of the crime.').
120 Unocal Corp, 395 F3d at 950, quotingFurund4jia, 38 ILM at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 885 F Supp 2d 17 (DDC 2012) (vacated in part by US vAli, 885 F Supp 2d 55 (DDC 2012)).
Note that while this case acknowledged that UNCLOS's aiding and abetting is synonymous with
the US domestic legal doctrine of aiding and abetting, the court ultimately vacated the opinion
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aiding and abetting within the prohibition of piracy."2 This conclusion supports
the argument advanced in this section. The defendant, however, was not a pirate
kingpin but rather a ransom negotiator. The court based its aiding and abetting
finding on the Geneva LOS language extending the piracy definition to those
"intentionally facilitating" piratical acts. A strong argument can be made that
facilitation is not synonymous with all aiding and abetting because facilitation
seems to have an ex ante component."z That is, one cannot facilitate a crime
after it has occurred. Defining the aiding and abetting portion of piracy and tying
it to treaty language depends in turn on delineating when an act of piracy begins
and ends.
On the one hand, the taking of a hostage is the entire primary act of piracy
because it is only this attack-and not the subsequent negotiations-that
directly impact the safety of navigation; the Geneva LOS, UNCLOS, and the
Rome Convention all center on ensuring safe navigation. Under this approach,
ransom negotiators cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting piracy under
international treaties. On the other hand, the traits of modem-day piracy and
commercial shipping make it such that more often than not the real threat to
commercial shipping is the ex post cost of ransoms. As such, modem piracy
includes the act of ransom negotiation. Under this approach, ransom negotiators
are clearly liable for aiding and abetting piracy.
Holding ransom negotiators liable for aiding and abetting piracy raises the
difficult question of why ransom negotiators on behalf of shipping companies
are not similarly liable. After all, it takes two to negotiate. If piracy includes the
act of negotiation, then shipping companies and governments will be precluded
from retrieving hostages for fear of violating international treaties. While this
may have a strong deterrent effect on hostage-taking overall, it is not a realistic
option and puts lives at risk in direct contravention of the most basic UN
Charter preambulatory principles.
3. A solution that permits aiding and abetting liability to apply in the
piracy context.
"Intentionally facilitating" in international treaties should be read as a form
of aiding and abetting, but with a stronger mens rea requirement. This would
require a departure from the language of Furund! la, in which a reasonable
upon finding that due process did not permit the defendant's prosecution because he had not
acted on the high seas.
122 US vAli, 885 F Supp 2d at 28-35.
123 See, for example, Kontorovich, From Prof Eugene Kontorovich, About Today's Piracy Decision (cited in
note 72).
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knowledge of the crime, rather than a positive intent for the crime to happen,
was considered sufficient."
There are two reasons why a higher mens rea requirement can be read into
piracy aiding and abetting than seen in Furundijja. First, a claim of necessity can
be made. Furund%"a dealt with human rights offenses. Using a looser mens rea
requirement implicates shipping companies' hostage negotiators, which is
necessary in order to prevent an intrusion into a core UN Charter principle-the
preservation of life. In contrast, human rights offenses are not necessary to
preserve this principle. Second, the language of "intentionally facilitating"
implies a higher mens rea requirement than mere aiding and abetting, and
innocent ransom negotiators can be protected from liability by disclaiming
intent. In order to keep the Rome Convention consistent with UNCLOS and
the Geneva LOS, the latter treaties should be read to require a higher mens rea
as well.
Thus, an understanding of treaty language couched in a slightly altered
Furundija standard supports the conclusion that piracy encompasses land-based
activities. Treaties would be benefited by express recognition that aiding and
abetting activities can occur on land and even after the attack, but such
recognition is not necessary.
B. Anticipatory Self-Defense and Counterterrorism
Antipiracy efforts can be further strengthened and justified by adopting the
counterterrorism doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. The adoption is logical
because piracy and terrorism are widely recognized as closely related criminal
activities and are often analogized with one another.2 ' Piracy and terrorism
often share a direct financial connection.126 Further, the two categories of crime
are linked historically, and this common historical basis is reflected in their
qualities and consequences.'27 Finally, the broad definition of piracy in
124 38 ILM at 366 ("[lit is not necessary that [an aider and abettor] shares and identifies with the
principal's criminal will and purpose, provided that his own conduct was with knowledge.").
125 See, for example, Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New
International Law, 13 U Miami Intl & Comp L Rev 293,293 (2006); Steven R. Swanson, Terrorism,
Piracy, and the Alien Tort Statute, 40 Rutgers L J 159, 159-60 (2008).
126 Madden, 21 USF Marit LJ at 153 (cited in note 15):
[P]irate endeavors may now serve as a source of funds for terrorist and
insurgent groups. Academic commentators have long speculated about the
links that exist between terrorist organizations and pirates. Even the United
Nations Security Council ... is now prepared to admit the connection may
exist in and around Somalia.
127 Burgess, 13 U Miami Intl & Comp L Rev at 297-98 (cited in note 125) ("[Pliracy is, in fact, the
legal genesis of modern organized terrorism. The commonalities between the two are profound,
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international law can accommodate acts of maritime piracy. While UNCLOS
language restricts piracy to acts committed "for private ends," '28 in practice, the
motives behind piratical acts are only analyzed to the extent necessary to ensure
that the act was not an accident. Thus, the broad understanding of piracy leaves
room for the possibility that "private ends" are religious or political, and so
maritime terrorism committed for ideological reasons may qualify as piracy.'29
Anticipatory self-defense is sometimes raised as a justification for
counterterrorism attacks. The concept of anticipatory self-defense is applicable
to piracy because capture of pirate kingpins on land would constitute self-
defense from almost inevitable future piracy. Anticipatory self-defense would
offer a new doctrinal tool for overcoming the constraints of territorial
sovereignty. In other words, it would function as a justification for limited
intrusions into pirate-harboring nations, permitting nations to capture pirate
kingpins on land.
There exist some important differences, however, between anticipatory
self-defense in the context of terrorism versus piracy. In the terrorism context,
anticipatory self-defense is only justified if the assassination conforms to all of
the settled rules of warfare, follows intelligence assessments that point to
preparations for warfare by the attacked party, and develops from carefully
calculated judgments that assassination is the least harmful self-defense in terms
of civilian protection."3 These conditions are inapplicable to antipiracy attacks
not only because the piracy context envisions capture rather than assassination,
but also because pirates are viewed as civilians and thus, by definition, cannot be
engaged in warfare. Any anticipatory self-defense provided for antipiracy attacks
within a noncompliant state's territory would be free of these conditions. The
warfare distinction may seem weak considering the factual similarities and
financial connections between pirates and terrorists, but it is strong enough to
preclude an anticipatory self-defense claim.
However, international warfare law ought not be entirely dispositive in
light of treaty language. The Rome Convention hints at an international
commitment to anticipatory self-defense. Art 3 § 2 makes the threat of any
piracy action a cnime if that threat is likely to endanger safe navigation.' 3' As
explained in Section V.A, the threat provision is applicable to piracy. This
from their aims, methods, and motivations on the one hand, and the deleterious effects on and
legal responses of the victimized state on the other.").
128 UNCLOS Art 101.
129 Houghton, 16 Tulsa J Comp & Intl L at 263 (cited in note 66).
130 Louis Rene Beres, After Osama Bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and Internafional Law, 44
Case W ResJ Intl L 93, 113 (2011).
131 The Rome Convention at Art 3 (cited in note 77).
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indicates an international legal commitment to preventative capture of pirates on
the basis of a threat rather than an actual attack. This legal commitment in some
way mirrors the logic of the US 2002 National Security Statement of the Bush
administration. 2 There, the magnitude of the harm and the unresponsiveness of
terrorists to deterrence measures justified the use of preventative force in the
face of imminent harm. A similar logic applies here in that the harm is great to
commercial activity and low-level pirates are not easily deterred.
Ultimately, the idea of anticipatory self-defense, while not entirely viable
outside the warfare context, is certainly useful in giving substance to the Rome
Convention's threat provision. Anticipatory self-defense in the counterterrorism
context explains the application envisioned by the Rome Convention language.
Perhaps just as importantly, counterterrorism efforts can aid in bolstering
antipiracy reform by riding the wave of more precise prosecution. Specifically,
the expansion of antipiracy efforts to include prosecution of land-based piracy
may be unpalatable to an international legal community that fears
encroachments on territorial sovereignty. But prosecution of land-based piracy
could be justified (and explained to a cautious observer) as necessary for
counterterrorism efforts. Reframing antipiracy law to address the real-albeit
tenuous-connection between terrorists and pirates would garner the attention
necessary for more salient prosecution and enforcement efforts.
C. From Definitions to Prosecutions
Once we have established that pirates can operate from land, states must
establish how to capture these pirates in light of territorial sovereignty concerns.
Aiding and abetting liability, coupled with anticipatory self-defense measures, are
perfectly compatible with existing treaties' piracy definitions if those definitions
are read to comport withjus cogens principles.
Importantly, the fight against piracy is generally recognized as a
peremptory norm. Thus, any failure to cooperate in this fight is arguably a
violation ofjus cogens. More convincingly, any limitation of piracy to the high
seas-either in regional treaties, domestic laws, or states' interpretations of
UNCLOS language-is ajus cogens violation.' Related to this requirement that
nations must recognize land-based piracy is the requirement that nations
cooperate in the peremptory norm of antipiracy efforts. Thus, both restricting
132 Full Text: Bush's National Security Strategy, NY Times (Sept 20, 2002), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/20/politics/2STEXT FULL.htmrpagewanted=all (visited
Apr 12, 2013).
133 Fedeli, The R'ghts and Liabilities of Private Actors at *8 (cited in note 88), citing Antonio Cassese,
International Law 141 (Oxford University Press 2005) (2001) and Davey, A Pirate LooksAt the
Twen-y First Centuy at 1216-17 (cited in note 97).
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the definition of piracy and impeding other nations' efforts to exercise
jurisdiction over pirates are violations ofjus cogens.
This view has uncertain implications for the validity of UNCLOS. On the
one hand, some scholars have hinted that UNCLOS may be void for its
restrictions on states' abilities to prosecute pirates."M On the other hand, perhaps
UNCLOS does not restrict the ability of states to fulfill the peremptory norm of
combatting piracy; it merely defines piracy. 3 ' But, functionally speaking,
restricting the parameters of a crime definition is identical to restricting the
ability of states to combat that crime.
In either event, the entirety of UNCLOS need not be voided. Rather, any
provisions restricting piracy to the high seas, and any reading that UNCLOS
excludes land-based piracy, are void. Under UNCLOS Article 105, all states can
prosecute the activity circumscribed by the piracy definition. 36 When this
definition is expanded to include land-based activity, a nation is able to pursue
pirate kingpins under universal jurisdiction, regardless of the nation's tie to the
specific crime. 3'
UNCLOS's and other treaties' piracy definitions need not be altered, but a
provision clarifying the land-based permissibility of aiding and abettingwould be
helpful. More importantly, pursuit of pirate kingpins on land should be
acknowledged as a peremptory norm, and any state that is unable to meet its
international obligation to pursue such suspects should partially forfeit its treaty-
based territorial sovereignty rights.'38 Failed states that are unable to officially
forfeit such rights should be considered automatically exempt from treaties'
territorial sovereignty protections. Pursuit into territorial waters and on beaches
would be forbidden. This serves the dual purpose of strengthening territorial
sovereignty and protecting local populations from actions that might exacerbate
piracy, a crime sometimes executed to avenge the foreign exploitation of local
134 Fedeli, The Rights and Liabilities of Private Actors at *8 (cited in note 88), citing Davey, A Pirate Looks
At the J'wen_-First Century at 1216-17 (cited in note 97):
There is an argument that the UNCLOS provisions on piracy violatejus cogens
by limiting piracy to the high seas. Universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy,
some scholars suggest, is a peremptory norm, and a treaty is void if it limits the
power of states to criminalize acts of maritime violence.
135 Fedeli, "he Rights and liabilities of Private Actors at *6-7 (cited in note 88) ("States may enter into
treaties that circumscribe the definition of piracy, as long as the treaty does not prohibit or limit
the power of states to exercise jurisdiction over such activity.').
136 Id at *8.
137 Houghton, 16 TulsaJ Comp & Intl L at 269-70 (cited in note 66).
138 See, for example, Doby, 41 J Mar L & Coin at 575 (cited in note 55), citing Dr. Lawrence
Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piray, 15 Ann Surv Intl & Comp L 43, 54 (2009)
(Instead of altering the UNCLOS definition, Dr. Kenyuan suggests that any State should "forfeit
its UNCLOS rights [if] unable to discharge its international responsibility.").
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resources. Thus, Somalia would engage in a sort of trade-of-rights: in exchange
for stronger control over its valuable territorial seas and beaches, it would
surrender certain sovereignty rights to permit nations to investigate, pursue, and
prosecute pirate kingpins operating safely on land.
VII. CONCLUSION
"An eighteenth-century document should not be interpreted to bar
measures essential to the defense against twenty-first century threats." '139
Although modem-day piracy looks very different from the piracy originally
circumscribed by existing piracy definitions, UNCLOS, the Geneva LOS, and
the Rome Convention need not be thrown out wholesale. Rather, the existing
legal framework can accommodate the evolving state of piracy.
This Comment seeks an alternative solution with three goals in mind. First,
the new approach must create efficient deterrence, expending resources on the
capture of pirate kingpins and financiers rather than low-level pirates who are
unlikely to be deterred. Second, the new approach must recognize the evolving
nature of piracy networks, including land-based kidnappings and infiltration of
pirates into private security companies. Related to this goal is the need to avoid
mistaking declining attack rates for piracy eradication. Finally, the new approach
should use existing legal frameworks, including maritime treaties and the
counterterrorism agenda.
The approach operates from a consequentialist or functionalist standpoint,
which suggests that limiting intentional facilitation liability to actions on the high
seas cuts against broad attempts by all states to criminalize such behavior.
Construing international law to restrict piracy to the high seas defeats the
purpose and the object of the various antipiracy statutes. The existing safe
harbor provided by territorial waters provides no deterrent effect to the crime of
piracy, and arming ships may lead to grave legal difficulties. Focusing on the
intentional facilitation of piracy as the crux of the crime's international law
definition is narrow enough to protect territorial sovereignty concerns but broad
enough to satisfy a centuries-old peremptory norm.
The proposed solution both constricts and expands existing piracy law. To
further territorial sovereignty, it constricts international law to exclude physical
hot pursuit within territorial waters and on land in the absence of express
consent and bilateral treaties. To target piracy efficiently, it expands piracy law to
include aiding and abetting in the piracy definition. It uses the framework of
139 Richard A. Posner, On Being Overinvested in Law as a Weapon Against Terrorism, in Christopher K.
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anticipatory self-defense to justify limited intrusions into noncompliant nations.
Finally, it establishes eradication of land-based pirate kingpin activities as a
peremptory norm, thus laying the groundwork for nations to exercise universal
jurisdiction over land-based pirates even in the absence of express consent from
harboring nations. The solution recognizes the unique qualities of modem-day
piracy and compels international cooperation in the fight against a uniquely
international crime.
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